The State Board of Education v. the State Board of Higher Education, University of Utah, and Utah State University of Agri-Culture and Applied Science : Brief of University of Utah by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
The State Board of Education v. the State Board of
Higher Education, University of Utah, and Utah
State University of Agri-Culture and Applied
Science : Brief of University of Utah
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.the Attorney General of the State of Utah; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent, Edward W. Clyde and Henry S. Nygaard; attorneys for University of Utah,
Mark Madsen; Attorney for Utah State UniversityDennis McCarthy and John H. Snow; Attorneys
for Appellant; Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Board of Education v. Board of higher Education, No. 13003 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3290
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
•VI- Plaintf /f-Respontlenl, 
THE STATE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 
Def """'1m-AfJPBUMR, Case No. 
UNIVERSITY OF UT AH, a corporate body politic, and 13003 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGR!CUL'IURE 
AND APPLIED SOENCE, 
Plaintiffs in 11'11'1'11el'llion t.mtl R11fJ°""'111s. 
BRIEF OF UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District G>utt in a.ad for 
Salt Lake County, Sa.te of Utah 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge. 
THE ATfORNEY GENERAL 
OFTIIE STATE OF UTAH 
735 State Capitol BuildiDB 
~Lake City, Utah 84114 
VmtL I.. TOPHAM 
G. BLAINE DAV§ 
BlUCEMHALE 
tf.11"""1s f tW Plainliff-
Rasptmtlent 
BDWiUD W. O.YDE 
351 SOurb State Street 
lik lab: City, Utah 84111 
Mid 
H!NU S. NYGAARD 
113 Physical Science Building, 
University of Uub 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 
AllorMJs f tW the Ut1ivHsH'J 
of Uhlh 
MARK MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 Capitol Building 
Sak Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Utah State 
University 
FILE o 
OCT 1 01972 --ci;.,5------
UPf'91Re Collrf-:-ut;;;--. 
VAN CO'lT,BAGLEY, 
CORNW All. a MtCAll'I11Y 
DENNIS Md:AJ.TIIY 
Suite 300, 
141 East P.irst South 
Sak Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
WORSLEY, SNOW 
& CHRIST.BNSEN 
JOHNH.SNOW 
Seventh Floor, 
Continental Bank Buildiag 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
AttOffWJS fOf' A~ 
INDEX 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE ------------------------------------------------ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT -------------------··· 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------·------------·--- 2 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT---------------·-····--·-···--·-····--3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1969 IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ---·---··---··---··--··---··-·····-·····-· 4 
POINT II 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1969 
DOES CREATE AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
TO SUPERVISE, CONTROL AND GOVERN 
HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIOLATION OF 
SEC 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND DOES 
CREATE AN AGENCY INDEPENDENT OF 
THE UNIVERSITY TO EXERCISE ALL ESSEN-
TIAL UNIVERSITY FUNCTIONS ····--····--····-·--···· 9 
POINT III 
IT WAS THE INTENTION OF AR TI CLE X, 
SEC 4 TO PERPETUATE THE LOCATION AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNIVERSIY UN-
DER EXISTING LAW AND TO PERPETUATE 
ALL RIGHTS, IMMUNITIES, FRANCHISES AND 
ENDOWMENTS WHICH WERE CREA TED OR 
CONFERRED ON THE UNIVERSITY PRIOR 
TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 16 
INDEX (Continued) 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Allen v. Rampton, 23 Ut. 2d 336, 463 P. 2d 7 ( 1969) .. 4, 2 
Backman v. Salt Lake County, 
13 Ut. 2d 412, 375 P. 2d 756 ................................... . 
Board of Education of Ogden City v. Hunter, 
159 P. 1019 .............................................................. 2 
Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. 1, 
16 Ut. 2d 280, 399 P. 2d 440 ( 1965) ................... . 
Hansen v. Legal Service Committee, 
19 Ut. 2d. 231, 419 P. 2d 979 (1967) ................... . 
Hudson v. Kelly, 76 Ariz. 255, 263 P. 2d 362 ............. . 
New Park v. Tax Commission, 
113 Ut. 410, 196 P. 2d 485 .................................... 2 
Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Ut. 2d 383, 464 P. 2d 878 ........... . 
Spence v. Utah State Agricultural College, 
119 Ut. 104, 225 P. 2d 18 ........................................ 1 
State Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, 
122 Ut. 164, 247 P. 2d 435 ...................................... 1 
State ex rel Josephs v. Douglas, 
33 Nev. 82, 110 P. 177 ......................................... . 
Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Ut. 403, 393 P. 2d 795 ................... . 
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, State Auditor, 
77 Ut. 455, 297 P. 434 ........................................... . 
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 
4 Ut. 2d 408, 295 P. 2d 348 ................................ 16, 1 
Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
107 Ut. 224, 151 P. 2d 467 .................................... 2 
INDEX (Continued) 
Page 
CONSTITUTION 
UTAH CONST., ART. VI, §29 ........................................ 7 
UTAH CONST., ART VII, §13 ...................................... 6 
UTAH CONST., ART. VII,§ 17 .................................... 4 
UTAH CONST., ART. VII,§ 18 ...................................... 8 
UTAH CONST., ART. X, § 2 .................................... 1, 10 
UTAH CONST., ART. X, § 4 
·································· 2, 3, 9, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24 
UTAH CONST., ART. X, § 8 ................ 1, 2, 9, 10, 15, 24 
UTAH CONST., ART. XXIV ........................................ 20 
I , 
; I 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-16-2 .............................. 10 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-2 ............................ 10 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-4 ........................ 10, 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-5(5) .................... 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-5 (6) ...................... 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-6 ............................ 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-7 ........................ 12, 13 
4 UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-8 .............................. 13 
6 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-10(1) .................... 11 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-10(5) .................... 11 
8 UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-12 ............................ 13 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-13 ...................... 12, 13 
7 UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-14 ........................ 14 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-15 .......................... 15 
4 I UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-15 (5) .................... 15 
INDEX (Continued) 
Page 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-15(6) -------···········--15 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-16 ............................ 15 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-17 .................... 11, 15 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 53-48-21 .......................... 12 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 63-2-15 .............................. 6 
UTAH CODE ANNO., 1953, 63-2-20 .............................. 6 
ARTICLES 
Earl T. Crawford, Statutory Construction, 
1940 Ed ................................................................... 25 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STA TE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
-vs- Plaintiff-Respondent, 
THE STATE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a corporate body politic, and 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE 
AND APPLIED SCIENCE, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents. 
Case No. 
13003 
BRIEF OF UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge. 
NAWRE OF THE CASE 
This action was filed by the State Board of Education. It 
challenges the constitutionality of the High Education Act of 
1969. (The Act, Chapter 48, Tide 53, Utah Code Annotated) 
The assertion is that the Act encroaches on the powers and 
duties vested by the Constitution in the State Board of Education 
under Article X, §§ 2 and 8. Article X, § 2, defines the public 
school system to include: 
" ... kindergarten schools; common schools, con-
sisting of primary and grammer schools; high schools, 
an agricultural college; a university; and such other 
schools as the Legislature may establish. 
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Article X, § 8 vests: 
"The general control and superv1s1on of the public 
school system . . . . . in a State Board of Education, 
the members of which shall be elected as provided by 
law .... " 
The University of Utah intervened. It specifically desired 
to have the court also consider Article X, § 4, which provides 
that: 
"The location and establishment by existing laws of 
the University of Utah and the agricultural college are 
hereby confirmed, and all the rights, immunities, fran. 
chises and endowments heretofore granted or con-
ferred, are hereby perpetuated unto said University and 
Agricultural College respectively." 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was presented to the lower court on motions 
for summary judgment by both plaintiff and defendant. The 
court granted plaintiff's motion, and decreed that the Higher 
Education Act of 1969 is null and void, and unconstirutional, 
being in conflict with Sections 2 and 8, Article X of the Utah 
Constitution. The trial court further concluded that this de-
termination made it unnecessary to determine whether or not 
the authority and power conferred upon the Board of Higher 
Education also conflicts with Article X, Sec. 4 of the Constitu-
tion, which deals with the University of Utah and the agricul-
tural college, now Utah State University. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The University of Utah seeks to affirm the decision of the 
Lower Court, and if the decision is affirmed, to have the Su· 
preme Court indicate what the relationship should be between 
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the University of Utah under Section 4 and the plaintiff (State 
Board of Education) under Section 8. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As we will demonstrate, the State Board of Higher Edu-
cation is an entity separate and apart both from the University 
and from the State Board of Education. The powers and duties 
expressly granted to the State Board of Higher Education leave 
essentially no functions with the University or with the plain-
tiffs State Board of Education. Thus, the University of Utah 
asserts that the Act is unconstitutional, because it violates both 
Section 4 and Section 8 of Article X. 
There may be a question as to who should speak for the 
University in this litigation, but we believe that there is no 
doubt that the University's position should be asserted. The 
Board of Regents was abolished by the Act. The Act, as we 
shall see, purported to vest in the Higher Board all of the 
essential functions of the University. From the answer and 
legal memoranda filed by the Higher Board, there is no gues-
t1on as to its position. If it could speak for the University, 
it would have the University urge that the Act is constitutional, 
and does not violate either Section 4 or Section 8. Present coun-
sel for the University were appointed by the Attorney General. 
They, the President of the University of Utah, and the Insti-
tutional Council at the University all assert that the Act is un-
constitutional. It is the University as an institution which has 
intervened, and it is the University which is before the court. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1969 IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
There has been a long line of decisions by Utah 
Supreme Court which have held that the Legislature may not 
create separate statutory boards and give them powers which 
encroach upon the powers and duties of constitutional boards 
and officers. 
In Allen v. Rampton, 23 Ut. 2d 336, 463 P. 2d 7 ( 1969), 
the court held unconstitutional the State Money Management 
Act, because it encroached upon the constitutional powers and 
duties of the State Treasurer under Article VII, § 17. That 
section provides: 
". . . . . the Treasurer shall be the custodian of public 
moneys, and . . . . shall perform such other duties as 
may be provided by law." 
The court noted that the State Money Management Act, 
among other things, created a division of investments and an 
investment council to be composed of the State Treasurer, the 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and three other mem· 
bers appointed by the Governor. The Act provided for em-
ployment of a chief administrative officer and financial analyst, 
and empowered the council to promulgate the rules pertaining 
to the investment of public funds. The court noted that the 
Constitution did not detail what the duties of the treasurer are, 
because prior to the adoption of the Constitution the duties 
were so well known that the framers of the Constitution may 
have considered it unnecessary to detail them. The court cited 
State ex rel Josephs v. Douglas, 33 Nev. 82, 110 P. 177 
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( 1910) to the effect that every constitutional officer derives 
his power and authority from the Constitution, and the Legis-
lature is powerless to add to those duties, or to take away 
duties which naturally belong to the constitutional office. The 
court also quoted from Hudson v. Kelly, 76 Ariz. 225, 263 
P. 2d 362 ( 1953) where the court held that a statute requiring 
a constitutional officer to be subservient to the dictates of 
some appointive officer is equivalent to abolishing the off ice 
and creating another in lieu thereof to exercise its duties and 
functior1s. 
The court acknow I edged the rule that every effort should 
be made to uphold and harmonize a statute with the Consti-
tution. but said that it should not shrink from its duty to de-
clare an act unconstitutional where it appears to the court that 
the Act conflicts with the Constirution, and said: 
"{6} The electorate of this entire state has chosen 
the plaintiff as its treasurer because of the confidence 
it had in his ability to perform the duties of his office 
and in his integrity. The act here questioned attempts 
to take from him those duties which have belonged to 
his office since statehood and prior thereto to the terri-
torial treas~m:r. If he fails to measure up to the re-
quirements of his office, that self-same electorate which 
elected him to office can remove him; and if he fails to 
keep safely the public funds entrusted to his care and 
keeping, then he and his bondsmen will have to re-
spond for any los~es sustained. To impose "ministers" 
upon him '"horn he can neither hire nor fire and who 
can choose thr: depositories for funds entrusted to his 
care which, if lost, will result in liabilitv to him and his 
bondsmen is an undue interference with his constitu-
tional rights and duties. Who is there to say that the 
app::'Jlant, the choice of the people of this state, is not 
qualified to select deputies knowledgeable in financial 
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matters as would be the members of the division of in. 
vestments? Would it not be better to run the invest-
ment officer or the fiscal analyst for the office of state 
treasurer at the next election if they be better qualified 
for the job than is the appellant, than to divest the 
state treasurer of the duties enjoined upon him by the 
Constitution of this state?" 
In Toronto v. Clyde, 15 Ut. 403, 393 P. 2d 795 ( 1964) 
the Secretary of State asked the court to hold unconstitutional 
the State Finance Act. This Act proposed to vest in the Gov-
ernor and the newly created office of the Director of Finance 
powers which plaintiff asserted were vested in the Board of 
Examiners under Article VII, Section 13. Prior to this Act, 
the Department of Finance only certified the availability of 
funds and the Board of Examiners approved the disbursements. 
Under the new Act, the Director of Finance assumed both the 
duty of determining the availability of funds and also the prop· 
riety of the expenditures. The court held that the power to 
set or pass on salaries is necessarily included within the gen· 
eral supervisory power over expenditures, and that authorizing 
the Director of Finance to fix a schedule of salaries was un· 
constitutional. 
The court noted that essentially the same problem exist· 
ed with respect to §63-2-15, in that it purported to confer 
upon the Governor and the Director of Finance control over 
travel and mileage. The same problem was presented by §63· 
2-20, which purported to give the Governor and the Director 
of Finance general budgetary control over all state departments 
and institutions. The Act prohibited allowance of requirements ' 
by departments and the creation of obligation without the ap-
proval of the Director of Finance. The Act also provided that 
it was the intent of the Legislature that the Department of Fi· 
nance shall examine and pass upon all proposed expenditures. 
This, the court said, could only mean that the Director could 
approve or disapprove any proposal. The court said that since 
rhe Constitution gave the Board of Examiners "the power to 
examine all claims," it is only reasonable to assume that the 
Constitution intended that the Board of Examiners should 
perform that duty. The court, therefore, held that the statute 
which undertook to vest these powers and duties in an agency 
created by the Legislature was unconstitutional. 
In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Ut. 2d 412, 375 
P. 2d 756, ( 1962) the court held that an act providing for the 
creation of a civic auditorium and sports arena district was un-
constitutional, in that it created a special commission which 
encroached on the powers of counties, in violation of Article 
VI, §29 of the Utah Constitution. This section provided: 
"The legislature shall not delegate to any special com-
mission, private corporation or association, any power 
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal im-
provement, money, property, or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, 
or to perform any municipal function." 
In holding that the Civic Auditorium and Sports Arena 
Act created a special commission in violation of this section, 
the court said: 
"Three conditions are necessary to violate this pro-
v1s1on: I ) delegation to a private commission of power 
to 2) interfere with municipal property or 3) to per-
form a municipal function .... " 
"We are convinced that the framers of our state 
constitution wisely anticipated the inroads that might 
be cut in the structure of local, representative govern-
ment, which fundamentally is composed of officials 
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elected by those closest to government, the electors, 
when they judiciously insisted on incorporating Art. 
VI, sec. 29 as a must in our constitution. We hold that 
this act attempted to create a special commission often. 
sive to the plain terms of Art. VI, sec. 29." 
In Hansen v. Legal Service Committee, 19 Ut. 2d 231, 
419 P. 2d 979 (1967) the court held an act providing for 
appointment of a legal adviser for the legislature was unconsti· 
tutional, in that if encroached on the powers of the Attorney 
General under Art. VII, § 18. The section simply provides: 
"The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of the 
State officers, and shall perform such other duties as 
may be provided by law." 
In Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Ut. 2d 383, 464 P. 2d 878 
( 1970), the court held unconstitutional a law permitting the 
president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House each to 
appoint three members of the State Board of Higher Educa· 
tion. The holding was that the power of appointment for 
offices created by law is vested by the Constitution in the Gov· 
ernor. 
In Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. 1, 16 Ut. 2d , 
280, 399 P. 2d 440 ( 1965), the court said that the County 
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Service Act was unconstitutional because the innumerable ac· 
tivities in which a service area may engage could emasculate ' 
the performance of municipal functions vested by the Consti-
tution in local corporate authorities. 
In Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, State Auditor, 77 Ut. 455, 
297 P. 434 ( 1931), the court held that the Constitution had 
vested in the Board of Examiners the power to examine all 
claims. The court refused to read into the Constitution the 
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concept that the Board of Examiners should pass only on 
"unliquidated claims", and said that where the Constitution 
has vested in the Board of Examiners the power to examine all 
claims, except those exempted, the Legislature cannot dele-
gate that power to any other board or officer. 
Thus, in Utah we have a numbers of officers, boards and 
commissions which are created by the Utah Constitution. Gen-
erally the Constitution does not endeavor to enumerate the 
powc:rs of these constitutional agencies. The language in nearly 
all cases is very general. The Legislature on many occasions 
has undertaken to create a legislative officer or Board or Com-
mission, to exercise part of such powers. The Utah Supreme 
Court consistently has held these acts to be unconstitutional. 
As we shall see, the Act here in great detail does delegate all 
of the essential powers of higher education to the Higher 
Board. We submit that this clearly violates Sec. 8 of Article 
X, in that it encroaches on the power of the elected plaintiff 
Board of Education, and that it violates Sec. 4, Art. X, because 
it takes from the constitutional entity (the University) all of 
the essential powers of the University, and attempts to vest 
them in a separate ]'.:'.gal entity. 
POINT II 
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1969 
DOES CREA T:~ AN INDEPENDENT AGENCY 
TO SUPERVISE, CONTROL AND GOVERN 
HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIOLATION OF 
SEC. 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND DOES 
CREA TE AN AGENCY INDEPENDENT OF 
THE UNIVERSITY TO EXERCISE ALL ESSEN-
TIAL UNIVERSITY FUNCTIONS. 
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The Act, in Sec. 53-48-2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, ex-
pressly states that its purpose is to vest "in a single board the 
power to govern the state system of higher education and within 
the board's discretion to delegate certain powers to institutional 
councils." The institutions enumerated are conceded by the 
appellant to be a part of the public education system (which 
is specifically defined by Section 2, Art. X) and which is by 
Section 8 placed under the general supervision and control of 
the State Board of Education. 
Section 5 3-48-4 creates a state board of higher education, 
which is empowered to sue and be sued and to contract and be 
contracted with. The Act vests in this state board "the control, 
management and supervision" of all of the institutions of 
higher education, including the university. The language used 
in the statute is substantially identical to the language of Sec. 
8, Article X. The statute expressly vests "the control, man-
agement and supervision" of higher education in the appel-
lant legislative board. The Constitution expressly vests "the 
general control and supervision" of public education in the 
respondent State Board. Under Section 5 3-48-4 the higher 
board also expressly succeeds to all of the powers heretofore 
held and exercised by the governing board of the University 
of Utah and the Utah State University of Agriculture and 
Applied Science. This section also places all other post high 
school institutions under the higher board, except the technical i 
college at Salt Lake and the technical college at Provo, which, 
1 
are to "remain" under the management and control of the 
State Board of Vocational Education, which is by statute (Sec. 
5 3-16-2) also the State Board of Education. If the two techni-
cal :;chools are to "remain" under the elected board there 
is certainly an implication that the other specifically enum-
10 
erated institutions are not to remam under that board. 
The state higher board is not required to function as the 
Board of Regents did. The Board of Regents, when it made a 
contract, did so in the name of the University of Utah. It was 
the University of Utah acting by and through the authority of 
its Board of Regents. In the Act, however, the higher board is 
a separate agency, and it is to this separate agency that the 
Legislature has delegated all of the powers, duties and responsi-
bilities of the University. There can be no doubt that the Act 
should be so construed. A few examples will suffice to demon-
strate this. 
In this regard see Sec. 53-48-17, of the Act, which ex-
pressly vesr.s in the higher board the power to approve or dis-
approve all new construction, repairs, the purchase of educa-
tional and general buildings, etc. This particular section con-
cludes by stating that: 
"No institution shall submit plans or specifications to 
the state building board for the construction or altera-
tion of buildings, structures, or facilities or for the pur-
chases of equipment or fixtures therefor without the 
authorization and approval of the board." 
Sec. 5 3-48-10 ( 5) expressly provides that each university 
may Jo its own purchasing, issue its own payroll, and handle 
its own financial affairs "under the general supervision of the 
board [the higher board} as provided in this act." Under sub-
section ( I ) of the same section all requests for state appropria-
tions shall be prepared by the higher board, and a combined 
appropriation shall be recommended. The section then ex-
pressly provides that the recommended budget for each insti-
tution shall be determined by the higher board "only after it 
has * * * consulted with the various institutions." 
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Under Sec. 53-48-21 the higher board is directed to con-
sult with the institutional council and./ or the president of the 
member institutions on matters pertaining to the respective in-
situtions. See also Sec. 5 3-48-7, infra, which authorizes the 
Higher Board to transfer staff functions, the institutional bud-
gets for those functions, and institutional personnel from the 
institution to the Board; and Sec. 5 3-48-13, which gives the 
Board control over the curriculum and programs, but pro-
vides that the institution can have a hearing before the Board 
in regard thereto. Thus, under the Act the higher board is to 
do the various things enumerated therein. In some cases the 
institutions, as distinguished from the board, may do these 
things under the supervision of the board. In other cases the 
higher board may only function after consultation with the 
institutions, but it is the higher board which performs the 
function. 
Referring back then to the specific powers granted to the 
higher board, we again note that under Sec. 5 3-48-4 it may sue 
and be sued in its own name and it may contract and be con-
tracted with. The Act vests in the higher board the control, 
management and supervision of all of the institutions of higher 
education now existing and those which may hereafter be 
created. 
Section 5 3-48-5 ( 5) contemplates that the state board 
shall have its own staff and chief executive officer. The board 
also under sub-section ( 6) is to appoint its own treasurer. 
Under Sec. 53-48-6 the board is directed to appoint a com-
missioner to serve as the chief executive officer of the board. 
The board sets his salary. 
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Sec. 53-48-7 provides for the appointment of professional 
administrative personnel. It then goes on to say that the board 
may transfer to its staff functions from one or more of the insti-
tutions in the state system of higher education. It also indi-
cates that funds therefore budgeted for the institutions for per-
formance of that function may be transferred from that insti-
tution to the higher board. This is one section in which the 
statute clearly recognizes that the institution is one entity and 
the higher board another. This section also permits the higher 
board to transfer personnel from the institution staff to its own 
staff. 
Section 5 3-48-8, in very broad language, places the man-
agement, supervision and control of the entire higher educa-
tion system under the higher board, including the making of 
a master plan, a definition of roles and programs for each insti-
tution, determining the needs for new programs, or the elimi-
nation or curtailment of existing programs, authorizes the 
higher board to initiate financing, to establish the operating 
and capital needs of each institution, and the system as a whole. 
It concludes by saying that the board "shall be responsible for, 
and is hereby empowered to do all things necessary for the 
effective implementation of a state-wide master plan, as adopted 
and revised by the board from time to time." The plaintiff state 
board is then directed to provide vocational education staff 
assistance in support of master planning. Again, the only 
recognition of any role by the plaintiff board is in connection 
with the technical schools. "All" other master planning "shall" 
be done by the legislatively created higher board. 
Section 5 3-48-12 empowers the higher board to estab-
lish all institutional roles, except those specifically assigned by 
the Legislature. It authorizes this board to prescribe the general 
course of study to be offered to each institution. Sec. 5 3-48-13 
gives the board control over the University's curriculwn. This 
section authorizes each institution to make changes, which the 
institution deems necessary, but requires that notice of any 
change in the curriculwn shall be promptly submitted to the 
Board. The section authorizes the board to review programs, 
including those funded by gifts, grants and contracts, and 
authurize the board to require modification or even to termi-
nate any such program. 
If the program is to be modified or terminated, the insti-
tution can have a hearing before the board - thus again the 
statute recognizes the separateness of the board and the insti-
tution. This section concludes by giving the plaintiff state 
board some voice in the curriculwn for the technical colleges, 
so as to coordinate these courses with the programs in the high 
schools and the area vocational centers - thus again indicat-
ing that the plaintiff board is to have no voice except in re-
lationship to the technical colleges. 
Sec. 5 3-48-14 gives the higher board control over the 
degrees to be awarded, and requires the prior approval of the 
board of the adequacy of the course of work and of the pro-
priety of the particular institutions issuing the degree. Sec. 
53-48-15 authorizes the board to employ the president, fix his 
salary and to dicharge him. The board also has the power, if 
it wants to reserve it, to hire all the administrative staff for the 
university, including the administrative officers, the deans of 
the schools, the professors, associate and assistant professors, 
and could prescribe their duties and determine their salaries. 
The board also could reserve to itself the power to provide for 
the constitution and organization of the faculty and the admin-
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istration and to enact rules and regulations for the government 
of the faculty. It is also indicated in sub-section ( 5) that the 
board could reserve to itself the power to control the direction 
of instruction and of examination and of admissions. Under 
sub-section ( 6) it could reserve the power to enact rules for 
the operation of the institution. These powers are all delegated 
by the statute to the institutions or their presidents, unless the 
board elects to reserve them for itself, but if it elects to re-
serve these powers, it obviously has complete control over 
personnel and even over the direction of instruction and of the 
examination and administration of students. 
Sec. 5 3-48-16 provides that the higher board shall succeed 
to and be vested with all powers and authority relating to all 
properties of the institutions, and to the control and manage-
ment thereof. Under Sec. 53-48-17 the higher board "shall 
approve or disapprove" all construction and repair, and specific-
ally provide that no "institution" may present any plan to the 
building board without the higher board's approval. 
We submit that the only reasonable construction of the 
act is that except for a minor role in the management of the 
technical colleges, the entire management, supervision and 
control of all of the institutions of higher education has been 
"vested" in the defendant board. There is no function left to 
the plaintiff board. The act did not intend to leave general 
control and supervision in the plaintiff board. In language 
substantially identical to Section 8, the Act vests control and 
supervision in the higher board. The Act also vests in the 
higher board all the powers of the University. In the exercise 
of these powers the board is to consult with the University and 
the other institutions, but the ultimate power is with the board. 
15 
The powers given to the higher board are so all-inclusive as 
to render everything in Article X, Sec. 4 meaningless. If the 
Legislature can create a separate agency to exercise the powers 
over the University, which are given to the higher board by 
this act, then the establishment of the University, which Section 
4 confirms, and the rights, immunities, franchises and endow-
ments which Section 4 perpetuates, are meaningless. 
POINT III 
IT WAS THE INTENTION OF AR TI CLE X, 
SEC. 4 TO PERPETUATE THE LOCATION AND 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNIVERSIY UN-
DER EXISTING LAW AND TO PERPETUATE 
ALL RIGHTS, IMMUNITITES, FRANCHISES 
AND ENDOWMENTS WHICH WERE CREAT-
ED OR CONFERRED ON THE UNIVERSITY 
PRIOR TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION. 
\Ve acknowledge that the status of the University of 
Utah and the state Agriculture College under the Constitution 
have heretofore been before this court. See Spence v. Utah 
State Agriwlture College. 119 Ut. 104, 225 P. 2d 18 
( 1950); State Board of Education v. Commission of Fi-
nance, 122 Ut. 164, 247 P. 2d 435 ( 1952) ;University of Utah 
v. Board of Examiners, 4 Ut. 2d 408, 295 P. 2d 348 ( 1956). 
We inttrpret these decisions to have held nothing more than 
that the University of Utah and the agricultural college (now 
U.S.U.) are subject to other constitutional entities and officers. 
The Higher Education Act of 1969 is the first attempt 
in the history of Utah for a legislative body to substantially 
alter the function and role of the University of Utah. This 
court must distinguish between legislative action designed to 
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assist the University in meeting current needs and problems 
and legislative action directed at substantially altering its form 
and function. 
We would respectfully ask the court to further consider 
the matter discussed in some detail by Mr. Justice Worthen in 
University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, supra, wherein he 
indicated that the University should under the constitutional 
language be subject to all laws enacted by the legislature from 
time to time, because of the phrase in Sec. 4, Article X which 
refer~ to existing laws. This language only occurs in the sec-
tion which reads, "The location and establishment by exist-
ing laws of the University of Utah," are hereby perpetu-
ated. We do urge that the phrase "existing laws" should 
be construed only as relating to the location and establishment 
of the University under existing laws, and that it was not in-
tended by those who framed the Constitution to give the legis-
lature the power to take from the University any of the rights, 
immunities, franchises and endowments which were granted 
before the Constitution was adopted. The very next phrase of 
Sec. 4 says that these rights, immunities, franchises and endow-
ments "heretofore granted or conferred" are hereby perpetu-
ated unto said university. This language specifically does not 
contain the phrase "under existing laws." 
We also direct the court's attention to the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Crockett, who said: 
"I concur in the opinion of Justice Worthen, adding 
this comment: It appears to have been the purpose 
of the constitutional founders ro continue the Univer-
sity as a public corporation permanently. Except to 
the extent stated below, I do not believe that the 
problems now confronting us require any further re-
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finement upon the contention of the University that it 
is 'a constitutional corporation, the highest form of 
juristic person known to the law, except the state 
itself * * *.' 
"It would undoubtedly require a change in the Con-
stitution to abolish the University or to change sub-
stantially its nature or function. With respect to its 
corporate status and existence, it is beyond the power 
of the legislative control. The importance and de-
sirability of a high degree of independence of internal 
function, and of academic freedom, was unquestion-
ably recognized by the founders. We are not here con-
cerned with any question of interference with the cor-
porate existence of the operation of the institution in 
any manner that would substantially alter its function 
as a University. A different question would arise 
should the legislature deliberately attempt to do so, 
or act so capriciously or arbitrarily with respect to 
appropriations or budgetary matters that such would be 
the effect of its action. Fortunately, we are not faced 
with any such problem, nor does anything here con-
fronting us give rise to any apprehension that we will 
be." 
We submit that the Act does raise the problem of chang-
ing substantially the nature and function of the University, 
as noted by Mr. Justice Crockett. We further respectfully sub-
mit that the inclusion of Sec. 4 in the Constitution was inten-
tional, and that it was intended to perpetuate more than the 
existence and location of the University. The matter was the 
subject of considerable debate in the Constitutional Conven-
tion. These provide considerable insight into the concerns of 
the delegates. 
Following considerable discussion of the difficulty of the 
high schools and universities as part of the common school 
system, Mr. Cannon at page 386-387 says, Mr. Chairman, I do 
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not understand this antipathy to the high school or to the 
university. I do not understand why the gentleman from the 
third precinct should make this motion at this time or why we 
should feel that we are too weak at this stage of our history 
to support a university. As far back as the 28th day of Feb-
ruary, 1850, the provisional government of this then supposed-
to-be state provided for a creation of a university. It was little 
more than two years after they had come into these valleys and 
at that time, they had scarcely enough to keep themselves 
alive; though they were poor in every sense of the word, sofar 
as wealth was concerned, they sought to establish then the 
foundations of this university. Why should we, after 35 years, 
feel too weak to perpetuate an institution which the pioneers 
themselves attempted to found? For years it struggled along 
scarcely recognized by public appropriation and attempted to 
encourage among the people of this territory a love for higher 
education and to do that which it could to elevate the educa-
tional standard among the people. Why should we now say, 
that in our constitution we shall not make mention nor provide 
for the establishment or perpetuity of this University that was 
thus early prepared and founded by those who came into these 
valleys .... " Mr. Richards on the same page said, " .... I 
think myself that there would be serious danger in leaving this 
matter to the legislature. We attempt here to prescribe what 
shall be done in regard to the establishment and maintenance 
of public schools, and if we cut this and say that it shall not 
be part of the public school system, I think it is a very serious 
guestion as to whether the legislature of the new state would 
be enabled to engraph that onto the system .... " He was 
discussing the inclusion of the high schools and universities 
as part of the public school system. 
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At one point in the deliberations, Delegate Snow moved 
to strike section 4 from the constitution saying, "Mr. Chair-
man, I move to strike out section 4. My object for moving to 
strike it out is this, that all the rights, immunities, franchises, 
and endowments that the University now enjoys will be ratified 
and perpetuated on the article on schedule, and that it is un-
necessary to repeat it here." The article on the schedule is 
Article XXIV of the Utah Constitution wherein specifically the 
rights and immunities of contract and the continuation of terri-
torial law are guaranteed. It will be noted that the motion was 
defeated and that Sec. 4 was included in the Constitution. 
The next major topic in the education field for the con-
vention was the unification of the University of Utah and the 
agricultural college. Much was made of the point of economy 
and the ability to perpetuate a higher quality education by 
consolidation of the University and college. The perennial 
discussion of duplication and elimination of unnecessary pro-
grams and expenses is covered in quite some depth between 
the pages of 1238 and the end of the section on education at 
1374. However, the main point which we can derive from this 
discussion is that the convention concluded that two institu-
tions, for various reasons, were better than one, and that the 
independence of the University of Utah and the agricultural 
college should be preserved. To provide some chronology to 
the minutes, and illustrate the nature of the discussion, the 
follo-wing passages are noted: 
At 1249 Delegate Lund said, "Mr. Chairman, I sincerely 
hope that the amendment striking out the words, 'agricultural 
college' will prevail. They are separate institutions. They are 
under separate boards and they have separate objects and ends 
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and aims in their instruction. The agricultural college in its 
instruction is preparing its students for industrial professions-
for trades .... When the legislature established the agricultural 
college, it did not see fit to place it alongside the University, 
and the reason beyond a doubt was that if it were placed near 
the University, and especially placed under the same Board, 
under the same supervision, the object of the agricultural col-
lege would be thwarted. Students would not be prepared for 
their trades, but they would be prepared for the university." 
At 1264 and 1265 Delegate Snow, in discussing the ques-
tion of whether the Constitutional Convention ought to re-
solve the issue, "It is the permanency of this question that I 
direct your attention to. If you permanently locate the college 
in Logan, the University perhaps at Salt lake City - it is in 
the constitution and if the economy should dictate the absolute 
necessity at some future time of uniting them, you are handi-
capped by this constitutional provision. Also, you have no 
precedent for it, and it would seem to me to be a matter that 
should be left to the legislature, whether they will have more 
time at their disposal, can get more information, and have time 
to mature a more deliberate judgment on the question of 
whether they should be united permanently or separated per-
manc:ntly." 
Delegate Cannon at 1348 in discussing the advantages of 
the Salt lake City site and the future of the educational oppor-
tunities at the University of Utah, makes specific note of the 
possibility of establishing a school of mines, a medical school, 
and a law school, all three of which have come to fruition at 
rhe University of Utah. 
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Delegate Roberts, (page 1364) said, "I am not willing 
that it should be left to the legislature when we are so nearly 
within the settlement of this question. Settle it now, and I 
tell you that one year, two years will not pass until you discover , 
that you have conferred great benefits upon the people of Utah. 
I am willing. Sir, to go as far as any other man in leaving as 
much as possible to the legislature. But I am not willing to 
skip this important question and shuttle it off on future legis-
latures." 
Delegate Farr at 1366 said: "This idea of leaving all to 
the next legislature to quarrel and to wrangle over, have so 
many fine speeches that we have had here overheard, and spent 
half a session and few thousand or few hundred thousand 
dollars in wrangling over that from session, I am opposed to it. 
I say, let us fix it, and have the Agricultural College at Logan, 
the facilities being all there, and let us have the University and 
be united in it." At the conclusion of the discussion a motion 
was made (page 13 72) to consolidate all institutions of higher 
education. This was rejected, and Article X, with Section 4 
retained therein, was adopted by a vote of 98 for, 3 against, and 
5 being absent. (page 1374) (Emphasis added) 
The above discussion clearly demonstrates that it was not 
the intention of Sec. 4 to leave to the legislature the power to 
consolidate the University of Utah and the Agricultural Col-
lege (now U.S.U.) nor to place them under one board. A 
motion to do this was rejected. Also, we submit that the dele-
gates did not want to leave to the legislature the location, 
existence. powers, rights, immunities, franchises and endow· 
men ts. 
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There can be no question that the founding fathers con-
firmed the establishment of two separate entities and the loca-
tion of the University of Utah at Salt Lake City and the Agri-
cultural College at Logan. The single-mindedness of the Con-
stitutional Convention delegates in their consideration of Sec-
tion 4 is ample evidence that while they were not at all un-
mindful of th e effects of confirming two separate institutions 
at rwo somewhat distant locations, the proponents of unifica-
tion of the institutions under one board did not prevail. As the 
minutes of the convention demonstrate, the intent of he fram-
ers of he constitution was to establish and locate two separate 
institutions of higher learning with different purposes and 
objectives for the benefit of the people of the state. Their 
actions expressly rejected combining them either in form, in 
location or under the direction of the same governing board. 
The minutes reflect the profound awareness that any means of 
connection or combination whether by the constitution itself or 
by permitting some future Legislature to engraft one to the 
other would seriously endanger the certainty of continued 
operation of each, the ability to fulfill their respective roles, 
purposes and objectives, and the ability of the state to provide 
quality higher education. (See the minutes of the Constitu-
tional Convention for March 26, 1895, pp. 386-387; April 
20, 1885, pp. 1237-1287; April 22, 1895, pp. 1304-1313; 
April 23, 1895, pp. 1331-1374.) 
In any event, it is submitted that the trial court is correct 
in its holding that the Higher Education Act of 1969 is uncon-
stitutional. There is no way that the Higher Board can perform 
the duties and exercise the powers specifically given to it by 
stature without encroaching on the power of the State Board 
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of Education. Further, we submit that Section 4, dealing with 
the University, was intentionally adopted by those who framed 
the Constitution, and that it does mean something more than 
that the University was perpetuated until the legislature elected 
to pass some other or different law. As between the State 
Board of Education and the University, there has heretofore 
been a stipulation entered and approved by the court. Whether 
or not the rights of public agencies can be fixed by stipula-
tion may be debatable. Nevertheless, these parties have agreed, 
and it probably is res judicata as to how they should function 
under Section 4 and Section 8. 
The appellant has over and over agam asserted that 
there is a strong presumption that the statute is constitutional; 
that the court only ought to declare otherwise under somewhat 
extreme conditions. All of the cases we have cited in the early 
part of our brief are cases where the court has declared a legis-
lative act to be unconstitutional. We think that the correct 
rule in this regard was stated by Allen v. Rampton, supra. 
Appellant has noted in its brief that where there has been 
an acquiescence by the legislature or long-standing interpreta-
tion, it is entitled to considerable weight. We, however, direct 
the court's attention to Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 107 Ut. 224, 151 P. 2d 467 ( 1944) and New Park v. 
Tax Commission, 113 Ut. 410, 196 P. 2d 485, where the Utah 
Supreme Court held that interpretation out of harmony and 
contrary to the express provisions of a statute cannot be given 
any weight. To do so would in effect amend the statute by 
erroneous construction, and substitute construction for legis-
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Jacion. The same rule should apply in constitutional law, and 
legislative interpretation out of harmony with the Constitution 
should be held to be a mere nullity. 
The transfer of authority back to the Board of Regents 
for the University of Utah, and to the Trustees for Utah State 
Univerity may not need new legislation. Those statutes which 
were repealed by the Higher Education Act of 1969 may be 
revived on the basis that they were unconstitutionally repealed. 
Earl T. Crawford in his work, Statutory Construction, 1940 
Edition, states on page 662 as follows: 
"In order for a repealing act to be effective, it may 
be stated as a general rule, chat it must be constitutional 
and valid, since a void or ineffective act obviously can-
not operate to abrogate a valid existing one. " 
On page 664, Crawford continues: 
"After a statute has been repealed, it may again be-
come operative as law, either through the enactment 
of legislation expresly reviving it, or by the operation 
of law." 
This general principle is fully adhered to by the Supreme Court 
of rhe Scace of Utah. In the case of Board of Education of Ogden 
City v. Hunter, 159 Pacific 1019 and specifically on page 
1024 rhe court states as follows: 
"The only question that remains to be determined 
is, What is the legal effect of declaring the provision 
aforesaid invalid? It is now well settled that in case 
ic is found that an entire statute, or only a particular 
provision of a statute, is invalid for any reason and a 
statute so found invalid has expressly or by necessary 
implication repealed another statute or provision upon 
the same subject, so much of the former statute which 
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was superseded by the invalid portion of the later one 
is not repealed but continues in full force and effect." 
We respectfully submit that the trial court is correct, and 
its decision should be affirmed. We further submit that the 
University of Utah and Utah State University are entitled to 
separate corporate existence, and separate governing boards, and 
that an effort to consolidate them be expressly rejected by those 
who framed the Constitution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'.EDWARD W. CLYDE and 
HENRY S. NYGAARD 
Attorneys for the 
University of Utah 
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